An optimistic fair exchange (OFE) protocol is an effective tool helping two parties exchange their digital items in an equitable way with assistance of a trusted third party, called arbitrator, who is only required if needed. In previous studies, fair exchange is usually carried out between individual parties. When fair exchange is carried our between two members from distinct groups, anonymity of the signer in a group could be necessary for achieving better privacy. In this paper, we consider optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures (OFERS), i.e. two members from two different groups can exchange their ring signatures in a fair way with ambiguous signers. Each user in these groups has its own public-private key pair and is able to sign a message on behalf of its own group anonymously. We first define the security model of OFFERS in the multi-user setting under adaptive chosen message, chosen-key and chosen public-key attacks. Then, based on verifiable encrypted ring signatures (VERS) we construct a concrete scheme by combining the technologies of ring signatures, publickey encryption and proof of knowledge. Finally, we show that our OFERS solution is provably secure in our security model, and preserving signer-ambiguity of ring signatures. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first (formal) work on this topic. Abstract. An optimistic fair exchange (OFE) protocol is an effective tool helping two parties exchange their digital items in an equitable way with assistance of a trusted third party, called arbitrator, who is only required if needed. In previous studies, fair exchange is usually carried out between individual parties. When fair exchange is carried out between two members from distinct groups, anonymity of the signer in a group could be necessary for achieving better privacy. In this paper, we consider optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures (OFERS), i.e. two members from two different groups can exchange their ring signatures in a fair way with ambiguous signers. Each user in these groups has its own public-private key pair and is able to sign a message on behalf of its own group anonymously. We first define the security model of OFERS in the multi-user setting under adaptive chosen message, chosen-key and chosen public-key attacks. Then, based on verifiably encrypted ring signatures (VERS) we construct a concrete scheme by combining the technologies of ring signatures, public-key encryption and proof of knowledge. Finally, we show that our OFERS solution is provably secure in our security model, and preserving signer-ambiguity of ring signatures. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first (formal) work on this topic.
Introduction
The concept of optimistic fair exchange (OFE) was first proposed by Asokan et al. [1] . By executing an OFE protocol, two parties in networks are able to fairly exchange their digital signatures with some help from an off-line trusted third party (TTP). An OFE protocol usually has at least the properties: fairness, non-repudiation and optimism. Fairness ensures that, if an honest party does not get a valid signature of the other party at the end of a fair exchange protocol, the other party cannot get that either. That is, either both two parties get each other's valid signature, or neither of them gets anything valuable. Non-repudiation guarantees that any party in a fair exchange protocol cannot repudiate or refute a valid signature after the protocol executed successfully. To reduce the load of the TTP, Asokan et al. proposed optimistic fair exchange [1] .
In an OFE protocol, there is an off-line TTP, called arbitrator, who acts as a judge to settle the dispute between two parties and should only be involved when the protocol does not run correctly (e.g. some parties cheating or communication channel interrupted). The rare involvement of a TTP makes the fair exchange protocol more efficient and secure.
An conventional way to build optimistic fair exchange protocols is verifiably encrypted signature (VES), which was formally defined by Boneh et al. [2] . A VES is an ordinary signature encrypted using the public key of a TTP, together with a verifiable proof showing the validity of the encryption. Suppose Alice and Bob exchange their signatures on a message. Due to mutual distrust, neither of them wants to send his or her signature first. To solve this dilemma, Alice can send a VES generated under a TTP's public key to Bob first. Then, Bob is able to verify the validity of the VES together with a proof showing that Alice's signature encrypted in the VES can be recovered by the TTP, but cannot obtain the original signature from Alice unless Bob sends his own signature to Alice. After that, if Alice refuses to reveal Bob her signature, Bob can ask the TTP to decrypt Alice's VES and obtain her original signature.
In some cases, the anonymity of participants in fair exchange might be important in order to protect participants' privacy. For example, in the developed commercial society, the personal preferences of negotiators in business contract signing usually influence the terms of the final agreement. If a trading company A has the old contract signing records of an employee as a negotiator in another company B which is a potential trade cooperator of A, A can use these records to generalize the negotiator's trading habits, by which the company A might get advantages in the future contract negotiation with the company B. Hence it is desirable that the employees who have the right to independently sign a contract on behalf of their own company can sign contracts anonymously, which will prevent other companies from knowing the signer's trading habits. To this end, ring signatures invented by Rivest et al. [3] are the good primitive to provide the property signer-ambiguity, which was formally defined by Abe et al. [8] . Informally, in a ring signature scheme, the public keys of a group of users are collected spontaneously to form a public-key list. When a signer signs a message on behalf of such a ring, he uses the public-key list and adds his own private key as a glue value to issue a ring signature. A verifier cannot tell who the real signer is, because the ring signature is validated using all the public keys of the ring without revealing any information about who produced it.
In this paper, we study optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures (OFERS), in which users in each ring can fairly exchange their ring signatures with ambiguous signers for the other ring. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on the topic to present a formal security model of OFERS and a concrete solution with provable security. After introducing some preliminaries in Section 2, we first rigorously define the security model of OFERS in the multi-user setting under adaptive chosen message, chosen-key and chosen public-key attacks (Section 3). This is done by updating the formal models of OFE [5, 6] in the scenario of ring signatures. Secondly, we present a concrete OFERS scheme (Section 4), which is constructed from verifiably encrypted ring signatures (VERS) based on Abe et al.'s scheme [8] under a TTP's public key, together with a proof of knowledge showing the validity of the original ring signature's encryption. Theoretically, any CCA2-secure [7] public-key encryption scheme can be used as such a proof of knowledge always exists (but may be not efficient). To provide practicality and high efficiency, Camenisch and Shoup's CCA2-secure encryption scheme [19] is particularly selected in the proposed scheme. Then, we formally show that the proposed OFERS solution is provably secure in our security model (Section 5). As the VES technique is employed, a notable feature of our scheme is that any holder (not necessarily the signer) of a valid ring signature can verifiably encrypt the ring signature to get a VERS without using any secret information from the signer. Due to this feature, our scheme not only preserves signer-ambiguity [8] of ring signatures, but also allows a signer to delegate a proxy (e.g. his/her secretary) to run OFERS after he/she produced a ring signature in advance. Finally, we discuss some extensions of our results and point out future work (Section 6).
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the technologies used in our OFERS scheme.
Ring Signature of All Discrete-log Case
Abe et al. proposed an abstract scheme of a ring signature and several concrete examples in [8] . For the sake of simplicity, we choose the ring signature scheme of all discrete-log case in [8] as our signature scheme. And Abe et al. have proved that this ring signature scheme is unconditionally signer-ambiguous and existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message and chosen public-key attacks. The details of the scheme are shown below: Let p i , q i be large primes, g i denote a prime subgroup of Z * pi generated by g i whose order is q i . Let y i = g xi i mod p i , where x i is the secret key and (y i , p i , q i , g i ) is the public key. H i : {0, 1} * → Z qi denotes a collision-resistant hash function. L is a list of (y i , p i , q i , g i ), where i = 0, ..., n − 1 and n = |L|. A signer with the secret key x k generates a ring signature on a message m under L as follows:
Send the verifier (c 0 , s 0 , s 1 , ..., s n−1 ) as the resulting ring signature on the message m under the public-key list L.
For i = 0, ..., n − 1, the verifier computes e i = g si i y ci i mod p i , and then
The verifier accepts the ring signature if c 0 = H 0 (L, m, e n−1 ), otherwise rejects.
Zero-knowledge Proof
In [9] , Ateniese introduced an underlying proof of the equality of discrete logarithms, which is used for constructing verifiably encrypted signatures. In [11] , Camenisch and Michels proposed a concrete scheme to prove the equality of discrete logarithms from different groups under the strong RSA assumption [12, 13] . In this paper, we modify Camenisch and Michels' proof as our zero-knowledge proof so as to build a verifiably encrypted signature scheme based on Abe et al. [8] 's ring signature introduced above. Camenisch and Michels' proof is denoted by P K{(α, β) :
The details of the proof are shown below:
n is the product of two sufficiently large safe primes and must be large enough to avoid factoring. h 1 and h 2 are two random elements with large order from Z n . Let G 1 and G 2 be two distinct groups of orders q 1 and q 2 such that 2 l+1 < min(q 1 , q 2 ), where l is an integer, and g 1 and g 2 are the generators of G 1 and
, > 1 is a security parameter which controls the tightness of the statistical zero-knowledgeness. If −2 (l−2)/ < x < 2 (l−2)/ , the prover can convince the verifier that log y1 g1 = log y2 g2 in Z by the following steps:
1. The prover randomly chooses r ∈ Z n and computesỹ = h
where k is the length of bits of the verifier's challenge, and computes the commitments: Note that the proof above is based on the strong RSA assumption. The prover should not know the factoring of n. Hence n, h 1 , h 2 might be generated by the verifier or a trusted third party. Before executing the proof, the prover should check whether n is the product of two safe primes (see [14] for details) and whether h 1 and h 2 have large order (see [15] for details). To convert this interactive proof into a signature form on a message m, the prover can use a suitable hash function h(·), which is agreed by the verifier, to compute the hash value of all the public information instead of the verifier's challenge c ( e.g. c = h(m||ỹ||y 1 ||y 2 ||g 1 ||g 2 ||t 1 ||t 2 ||t 3 ) ).
Encryption Scheme
In [9] , Ateniese proposed a method to construct verifiably encrypted signatures by encrypting an ordinary signature using some specific public-key cryptosystems and giving a proof showing the validity of the signature's encryption. In such cryptosystems (e.g. Naccache-Stern [16] , Okamoto-Uchiyama [17] and Paillier [18] public-key cryptosystems), computing a discrete logarithm using the secret key is an easy task, but without the secret key, it is still hard. However, all these public-key cryptosystems above do not satisfy the high level security which protects against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA2). In [19] , Camenisch and Shoup proposed an adaptation of Paillier cryptosystem, which is proven secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks under the decisional composite residuosity assumption [18] . To achieve the high level security, we use Camenisch and Shoup's scheme as our encryption scheme, which is briefly described as follows:
1. Randomly select two Sophie Germain primes p and q , where p = q , and compute safe primes p = 2p + 1, q = 2q + 1 and n = pq. Then randomly select
2 ), where 0 < a < n 2 , to (n 2 − a mod n 2 ) if a > n 2 /2, and to (a mod n 2 ) otherwise. Obviously for any v ∈ Z *
H is a collision-resistant hash function. A label L is some public information added to the ciphertext (e.g. user's identity or expiration time). The public key is (n, g, y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ), and the private key is ( instead, but s i is 'hidden' in w i since in this ring signature scheme computing a discrete logarithm is hard, which means the verifier has not got the full ring signature yet. Beside that, the signer needs to give a zero-knowledge proof for convincing the verifier that the encrypted s i is just the s i hidden in w i . Note that encrypting only one value in (s 0 , s 1 , ..., s n−1 ) can also ensure the initial ring signature hidden partially, which means the verifier still cannot draw the full ring signature from the partially encrypted ring signature even though he gets the most parts of the initial ring signature. Encrypting one value makes the cost of generating a VERS does not depend on the size of the public-key list, which improves the efficiency of the generation of a VERS.
To produce a verifiably encrypted ring signature, suppose the signer randomly chooses s u , where 0 u n − 1, from (s 0 , s 1 , ..., s n−1 ) as the hidden value, and encrypts s u using Camenisch and Shoup's encryption scheme above. Let (n, g, y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , h) be the public key of a TTP. H is a collision-resistant hash function, and L is the public label. The signer computes s u 's ciphertex-
, where t ∈ R [n/4]. After that, by modifying the zero-knowledge proof introduced in Section 2.2, the signer gives a non-interactive proof: P K{(s u , t, r) :
l } to convince the verifier that the TTP can extract s u using its secret key and recover the original ring signature completely. Note that anyone beside the signer has the capability to convert a valid ring signature into a VERS without knowing any secret information from the signer. The property signer-ambiguity [8] is well preserved since the hidden value can be arbitrarily chosen in (s 0 , ..., s n−1 ) and no secret of the signer is needed for producing a VERS based on a given ring signature. In our verifiably encrypted ring signature scheme, for the sake of simplicity, we specify s n−1 as the hidden value encrypted using a TTP's public key no matter who the signer is. The details are shown in Section 4.
Security Definitions
In [5] , Dodis et al. presented a formal security model of optimistic fair exchange under adaptive chosen message attacks in a multi-user setting, in which the optimistic fair exchange protocol can be executed between different signers and different verifiers. That is, multiple pairs of users can run the two-party fair exchange protocol without compromising security. In adaptive chosen message attacks [20] , an adversary can access the signing oracle by asking for signatures on arbitrary messages. In ring signatures, there are multiple users belonging to each public-key list. So the multi-user setting is necessary for fair exchange of ring signatures. Furthermore, Huang et al. [6] extended Dodis et al.'s model by considering chosen-key model, i.e. an adversary may win a computational game if it is allowed to employ some public keys without knowing the corresponding private keys. By providing this extra flexibility, the chosen-key model is stronger than the certified-key model (shown in [6] ). In addition, we also consider chosen public-key attacks in the setting of ring signatures, which is proposed by Abe et al. [8] . In chosen public-key attacks, any adversary who wants to forge a ring signature is only allowed to use arbitrary subsets of the initially considered public-key list to access the signing oracle, but cannot append new public keys to the initial public-key list. Therefore, in our security definitions specified below, all the four factors above are addressed in the setting of OFERS as a whole.
Definition 1. (Syntax) Optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures (OFERS)
consists of seven probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms.
-Setup TTP : On input a security parameter Param, the arbitrator executes the algorithm to generate a public-private key pair (AP K, ASK) and some auxiliary information if necessary.
-Setup
User : On input Param and (optionally) the arbitrator's public key with the auxiliary information, the algorithm outputs public-private key pairs (P K i , SK i ) for every user in the ring. The public keys form a public-key list L.
-RSig(m, L, SK s ): A signer U s in the ring executes the algorithm by inputting a message m, a public-keys list L including P K s and its corresponding private key SK s , then outputs a ring signature σ. -RVer(m, L, σ): On input a message m, a ring signature σ on m under a public-key list L, a verifier executes the algorithm to output either 1 or 0, which means accept or reject respectively. -PRSig(m, L, σ, AP K): On input a message m, a signer's public-key list L, a ring signature σ on m under L, and the arbitrator's public key AP K, the algorithm outputs a verifiably partial ring signature θ. -PRVer(m, L, θ, AP K): On input a message m, a signer's public-key list L, a verifiably partial ring signature θ on m under L, and the arbitrator's public key AP K, the verifier executes the algorithm to output either 1 or 0, which means accept or reject respectively. -Res(m, L, θ, ASK): The resolution algorithm is executed by the arbitrator if the verifier does not receive the full ring signature σ from the signer ring, but has got the corresponding verifiably partial ring signature θ. On input a message m, a signer's public-key list L and a verifiably partial ring signature θ on m under L, if θ is valid and the verifier has fulfilled its obligation to the signer, the arbitrator extracts the full ring signature σ from θ using its private key ASK and reveals it to the verifier, otherwise rejects.
Since there are three roles (signer, verifier, arbitrator ) in OFERS, we should consider how each role may violate different aspects of security, i.e. different security properties. Here we require the arbitrator should not be able to cheat some participant by colluding with the other participant in the protocol since such a collusive adversarial arbitrator can break the fair exchange trivially. Moreover, the property signer-ambiguity should also be addressed as it is the heritage of ring signatures. Security Against Signers: For the fairness to verifiers, it is required that except negligible probability, any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversarial signer A should be not able to generate a verifiably partial ring signature, which can be accepted by verifiers, but cannot be recovered to a valid full ring signature by an honest arbitrator. The property is formally defined by the following game:
where O Res denotes a resolution oracle, which takes as input a verifiably partial ring signature on a message m under a public-key list L, and outputs a full ring signature σ on m under L. In this game, the adversary A is allowed to arbitrarily (i.e. not necessarily following the key generation algorithm) generate public keys to form a list L * . For each public key in L * , A may not know the corresponding private key. The chosen-key model is therefore accommodated here.
Definition 2 (Security Against Signers) Optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures is said to be secure against signers if there is no PPT adversarial signer A who wins the game above with non-negligible probability.
Security Against Verifiers: The property of security against verifiers requires that, without help from the signer or the arbitrator, any PPT adversarial verifier B should not be able to extract a full ring signature from the corresponding verifiably partial ring signature with non-negligible probability. The property is formally defined by the following game:
where L is an arbitrary subset of the initial public-key list L consisting of all the P K i , the oracle O Res has been defined in the previous game, and the partial ring signature signing oracle O P RSig , given as input a message m and a public key list L , outputs a verifiably partial ring signature on m under L using the arbitrator's public key AP K. The Query(B, O Res ) is the set of valid queries which B asks to O Res . In this game, B can ask the arbitrator for resolving any verifiably partial ring signature with respect to any sublist of L. Note that here chosen-public key attacks are considered, as the adversary B is only required to output a valid ring signature under L which is a subset of L but not necessarily L. Moreover, L does not contain any public key generated by B. Otherwise, B can win the game above trivially.
Definition 3 (Security Against Verifiers) Optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures is said to be secure against verifiers if there is no PPT adversarial verifier B who wins the game above with non-negligible probability.
Security Against the Arbitrator: For the fairness to signers, the property of security against the arbitrator requires that except negligible probability, any PPT adversarial arbitrator C should not be able to produce a full ring signature without demanding the signer to generate a verifiably partial ring signatures. The property is formally defined by the following game:
where the oracles O Res , O P RSig , the public-key lists L and L have been described in the previous games, and ASK * is the state information of C, which may not correspond to the arbitrator's public key AP K. Query(C, O P RSig ) is the set of valid queries which C asks to O P RSig . We remark that this game considers both chosen-key and chosen public-key attacks in the multi-user setting, as the adversary C (a malicious arbitrator) does not need to know the corresponding private key of the public key AP K and can choose any sublist L of the initial public-key list to forge a ring signature.
Definition 4 (Security Against the Arbitrator) Optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures is said to be secure against the arbitrator if there is no PPT adversarial arbitrator C who wins the game above with non-negligible probability.
In [8] , Abe et al. specified the security definition of signer-ambiguity. In our OFERS scheme, the signer should be still ambiguous in its own ring. By updating Abe et al.'s definition in the setting of OFERS, we formally define signer-ambiguity as follows:
Definition 5 (Signer Ambiguity) Let L = {P K i } be an initial public-key list, where each P K i is generated by running Setup User → (P K i , SK i ), and AP K be the arbitrator's public key generated by running Setup TTP → (AP K, ASK). An OFERS protocol is called perfectly signer-ambiguous, if for any message m, any public-key list L, any public key AP K of the arbitrator, any valid full ring signature σ ← RSign(m, L, SK s ), and an associated verifiably partial ring signature θ ← PRSig(m, L, σ, AP K), where SK s is the signer's private key, given (m, L, θ, σ, AP K), any unbound adversary D outputs index i such that SK s = SK i with probability exactly 1 |L| , where |L| denotes the size of L. [8] for ring signatures, we also provide the verifiably partial ring signature θ of a full ring signature σ to the adversary D, which allows D acquiring more information to break signer-ambiguity. In fact, this is necessary because the signer-ambiguity in ring signatures does not always guarantee the same property for OFERS (refer to the counterexample discussion in Section 5). As the unbound adversary D can derive all private keys from L, the above definition essentially means that for fixed (m, L, AP K), the distributions of θ and σ generated by using any private key SK i are identical. In addition, Definition 5 specifies perfect signerambiguity, and it can be easily extended to define statistical and computational signer-ambiguity, two weaker versions of ambiguity.
Remark 1. Comparing with Abe et al.'s perfect signer-ambiguity

The Scheme
In our OFERS scheme, we use verifiably encrypted ring signatures (VERS) to construct verifiably partial ring signatures. In this section, we first present how to produce a VERS, and then give an optimistic fair exchange protocol of ring signatures. The generation and verification of ring signatures are similar to Abe et al.'s ring signature in all discrete-log case (see Section 2.1) except some limitation of selecting α and s i . For the sake of simplicity, in our VERS scheme, we always encrypt the last s i , i.e. s n−1 , as the hidden value. Obviously this does not affect the scheme's security since any s i in (s 0 , ..., s n−1 ) can be the hidden value no matter who the signer is. Then we use Camenisch and Shoup's CCA2-secure encryption scheme and give a proof:
for convincing the verifier the validity of the encryption (see Section 2.3).
Verifiably Encrypted Ring Signature
The generation of a VERS consists of two steps. One is producing a conventional ring signature consisting of three algorithms denoted by RS = (RKG, Sig, Ver), the other is encrypting the ring signature consisting of three algorithms denoted by EN = (Gen, Enc, Dec) with a zero-knowledge showing the validity of the ring signature's encryption. Suppose there are two rings called R I and R J . U i and U j denote the users in these two rings respectively. A signer U k in the ring R I sends a VERS on a message m to a verifier in the ring R J . L I and L J denote the public-key list of the ring R I and R J , and n I = |L I | and n J = |L J | denote the size of L I and L J respectively.
On input the security parameter Param, the arbitrator executes the key generation algorithm to output the public key (n, g, y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , h) and the private key (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) under Camenisch and Shoup's encryption scheme [19] . q A denotes the order of g, and l is an integer such that 2 l+1 < q A . Meanwhile, the arbitrator generates h 1 , h 2 and n, which are used in the zero-knowledge proof introduced in Section 2.2 (the modulus n must be large enough to avoid factoring but does not need to depend on Param) and publishes (n, g, y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , h, h 1 , h 2 , n, l).
Setup
User : The setup of users is similar to the ring signature scheme in Section 2.1. For the user U i , let y i = g xi i mod p i , where the order of g i is q i > 2 l+1 . x i is the secret key and (y i , p i , q i , g i ) is the public key. H i : {0, 1} * → Z qi is a collision-resistant hash function.
RSign:
The signer U k in the ring R I signs a message m by executing the algorithm below: PRSig: The algorithm is used for converting a full ring signature σ I to a verifiably encrypted ring signature θ I . Letĥ : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} η be a collision-resistant hash function and the public label L = m||L I .
1. Compute w = g sn I −1 n I −1 and encrypt s n I −1 by computing
PRVer: The verifier first computesĉ =ĥ(L I , m, w,ŵ, u, e, v,
, and checks whether c =ĉ and −2 l−1 < v 1 < 2 l−1 . If any condition does not hold, outputs the VERS θ I is invalid, otherwise computes e i = g Res: After the verifier shows a proof that he has fillfulled his obligation to the signer, the arbitrator decrypts the ciphertext (u, e, v) using its secret key (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) to extract s n I −1 , and reveals the full ring signature σ I to the verifier.
Optimistic Fair Exchange of Ring Signatures
By applying the verifiably encrypted ring signature scheme above, an optimistic fair exchange protocol of ring signatures can easily be set up. Suppose two users U i and U j in the rings R I and R J respectively exchange their ring signatures on a message m. The optimistic fair exchange protocol proceeds as follows:
1. U i computes his ring signature σ I =RSign(m, L I , SK i ), and converts this ring signature into a VERS θ I =PRSig(m, L I , σ I , AP K) using the arbitrator's public key AP K, then sends θ I to R J . 2. U j checks whether PRVer(m, L I , θ I , AP K)= 1. If no, U j quits, otherwise U j computes his ring signature σ J and sends it to R I . 3. U i checks whether RVer(m, L J , σ J )=1, if no, U i stops the protocol, otherwise U i sends σ I to R J .
4. U j checks whether RVer(m, L I , σ I )=1, if yes, U j accepts this ring signature. If σ I is invalid or U j receives nothing from R I , U j sends the arbitrator θ I and σ J to apply for resolution. The arbitrator first checks whether σ J is valid, if yes, the arbitrator runs the algorithm Res(m, L I , θ I , ASK) to recover σ I , then sends σ I to R J and σ J to R I . If σ J is invalid, the arbitrator will send a signal to both R I and R J to inform U i and U j that the protocol has been terminated.
Note that after Step 1, U j can decide to carry on the protocol at any time he wants, which might give U j some advantages. To solve this problem, before the protocol runs, U i and U j can set up a time point at which the protocol must be completed.
Security Proof
In this session, we prove that our OFE protocol for ring signatures is secure in the multi-user setting under adaptive chosen message, chosen-key and chosen public-key attacks. Let RS = (RKG, RSig, RVer) denote Abe et al.'s ring signature scheme, EN=(Gen, Enc, Dec) denote Camenisch-Shoup public-key encryption scheme, and π be a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof showing the proper encryption of a full ring signature. We have the following theorem:
The proposed optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures is secure, i.e. satisfies Definitions 2-5, if the underlying RS is secure with signer-ambiguity and existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message and chosen publickey attacks, EN is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA2), and π is a simulation-sound non-interactive zero-knowledge proof.
Proof. Security against signers: In our OFERS protocol, a valid verifiably encrypted ring signature θ = (c 0 , s 0 , s 1 , · · · , s n−2 , w, u, e, v,ŵ,ĉ, ) t for some t. The third part (ŵ,ĉ, t 1 , t 2 , u , e , v , v 1 , v 2 , v 3 ) provides a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof:
which shows that the encrypted s n−1 is the same value hidden in w. Suppose an adversary A breaks the security against signers in our OFERS protocol by forg- for s n−1 = s n−1 . For each public key in L * , A may not know the corresponding private key. According to Definition 2, A wins the game of security against signers if and only if the corresponding full ring signature of θ is σ = (c 0 , s 0 , s 1 , ..., s n−2 , s n−1 ) and (u, e, v) is decrypted to get s n−1 , where s n−1 = s n−1 . However, this is infeasible due to the soundness of the zeroknowledge proof π. Hence our OFERS protocol is secure against signers if π is a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZK).
Security against verifiers:
Suppose an adversarial verifier B breaks the security against verifiers in the proposed OFERS protocol. We now construct a distinguisherB, who can successfully distinguish the encryption of two messages with the same length of its choice from a challenger in the CCA2 game for Camenisch-Shoup encryption scheme with non-negligible probability. Note that B is allowed to access the decryption oracle O Dec of the encryption scheme. According to Definition 3, B wins the game of security against verifiers if B produces a valid ring signature σ on a message m under a public-key list L without asking the resolution oracle O Res any query (m, L , θ). As (m, L , σ) is a successful forgery of B, the situation that B did not ask any corresponding VERS θ of σ via the partial ring signature signing oracle O P RSig is negligible due to security against the arbitrator proved below. Hence we require that B gets θ from O P RSig here. Now we show how to constructB in detail.
For the given target Camenisch-Shoup encryption scheme EN=(Gen, Enc, Dec) with the public key AP K, the distinguisherB repeatedly , otherwiseB sends a random bit to the CCA2 challenger. Consequently, if B wins the game of security against verifiers with a non-negligible probability,B's advantage against its CCA2 challenger is also non-negligible. Hence our OFERS protocol is secure against verifiers if the underlying encryption scheme EN is CCA2-secure.
Security against the arbitrator: Suppose an adversarial arbitrator C breaks the security against the arbitrator in the proposed OFERS protocol. We construct a forgerC for Abe et al.'s ring signature scheme RS = (RKG, RSig, RVer) with access to a signing oracle O RSig .
For the initial public-key list L given to the forgerC, the adversarial arbitrator C takes L as input and then outputs (ASK * , AP K), where AP K is set as the arbitrator's public key for Camenisch-Shoup encryption scheme, and ASK * is the state information which may not correspond to AP K. (ASK * , AP K, L) is the input of the OFERS protocol. After that, C begins to ask queries to the partial ring signature signing oracle O P RSig , for which the responses can be perfectly simulated byC using O RSig : For any message m i and any sublist L ⊆ L,C asks its signing oracle O RSig to get a ring signature σ i , then encrypts σ i under AP K to get a VERS θ i and generates the NIZK proof π i . Finally, C outputs the forgery (m , σ ) such that RVer(m , L , σ ) = 1 and (m , L ) / ∈ Query(C, O P RSig ), which meansC never asks O RSig to response a valid ring signature on m w.r.t L . In our OFERS protocol, σ is just the conventional ring signature on m w.r.t L , sō C has succeeded for obtaining σ as the forgery of the message m without asking the signing oracle O RSig . It is contradictory to the existential unforgeability of Abe et al.'s ring signature scheme against adaptive chosen message and chosen public-key attacks. Hence our OFERS protocol must be secure against the arbitrator.
Signer ambiguity: Suppose that our OFERS protocol does not meet signer ambiguity, which means that there is an unbound adversary D can tell which private key SK s was used to produce a given tuple (m, L, θ, σ, AP K) with the probability not equal to 1/|L|. Then, from D we now construct an adversaryD that breaks signer ambiguity of Abe et al.'s ring signature scheme, which thus leads to a contradiction. For a given initial public-key list L in Abe et al.'s scheme we run the key generation algorithm of Chamenisch-Shoup encryption scheme to get the arbitrator's key pair (ASK, AP K). For a target (m, L, σ, AP K),D runs PRSig algorithm to get θ, i.e. θ ← PRSig(m, L, σ, AP K). By forwarding (m, L, θ, σ, AP K) to D,D just outputs the index returned by D as its guess which private key was used to issue (m, L, σ, AP K). It is easy to see thatD breaks the signer-ambiguity of Abe et al.'s ring signature scheme with the exact same probability as D breaks the signer-ambiguity of our OFERS protocol.
Remark 2. In the proofs above, we do not give the specific details about the underlying (Abe et al.'s) ring signature scheme and (Camenisch and Shoup's) encryption scheme, as our construction (specified in Section 4) can be extended to a generic scheme, i.e. based on any secure ring signature scheme and encryption scheme, the associated proofs can be obtained by simply adapting the proofs above. In addition, from our proofs we can see that a secure ring signature scheme with signer-ambiguity does not necessarily guarantee an OFERS protocol preserving the same property. The counterexample is very simple: just modify our OFERS protocol such that the VERS θ includes a public key P K i which indicates that the private key SK i was used to issue the corresponding ring signature σ. For this scheme, it is not difficult to see that the proofs for the first three properties still hold, but not for signer-ambiguity since, with the reminder P K i , the adversary can tell with the probability 1 that SK i was used to issue a tuple (m, L, θ, σ, AP K). Further discussions on these two issues will be given in the full version of the paper.
Conclusion
In this paper, for achieving better privacy in optimistic fair exchange, we present the first solution of optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures (OFERS) by first formally defining its security model in the multi-user setting under adaptive chosen message, chosen-key, and chosen public-key attacks. We have also proposed a concrete scheme of verifiably encrypted ring signature (VERS) and used it to build an optimistic fair exchange protocol. The proposed scheme is proved to be secure against signers, verifiers and the arbitrator and satisfy the property signer-ambiguity under our security definitions. As future work, it is interesting to design efficient OFERS protocols for different types of signatures, such as Abe et al.'s RSA-based ring signatures or mixed-type ring signatures [8] , and achieve other more security properties in OFERS, e.g. abuse-freeness.
